Andrew L. Urban
The accumulated evidence supports the calculation that Vladimir Putin is not ever going to stop his military aggression against Ukraine. Only military defeat will. And should.
The Kremlin has a history of thuggery that reminds us of Putin’s thuggish origins. I wrote about it under the heading A short history of Kremlin thugs in The Spectator Australia (December 20, 2025).
KGB logo (Wilikpedia)
The KGB was the Thug in Chief of the Soviet administration. Vladimir Putin was born in October 1952. For 15 years, he served as a foreign intelligence officer in the Soviet KGB, until 1990, when he retired from active KGB service with the rank of lieutenant colonel. Yeah, but his mindset stayed with the KGB.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin has periodically signalled openness to negotiations. These gestures—ceasefire proposals, talks through intermediaries, and public references to diplomacy—have led some observers to hope that Moscow might be prepared to end the conflict.
A closer examination of Russia’s conduct, strategic doctrine, and negotiating behaviour demonstrates a consistent pattern: negotiations are not pursued as a pathway to peace, but as a performative and instrumental exercise designed to advance Russia’s military and political objectives. Putin is not prepared to abandon the invasion; rather, he goes through the paces of negotiation to consolidate gains, fracture opposition, and reshape the conflict on terms favourable to Moscow.
A central indicator of genuine willingness to end a war is the revision or abandonment of maximalist objectives. In Russia’s case, there is no evidence of such revision. From the outset, the Kremlin framed the invasion not merely as a territorial dispute, but as a civilisational and security struggle: Ukraine was described as an artificial state, NATO as an existential threat, and Ukrainian sovereignty as incompatible with Russian security.
Despite battlefield setbacks, official Russian rhetoric has remained remarkably consistent. Moscow continues to assert claims over occupied Ukrainian territories, has formally “annexed” regions it does not fully control, and insists on Ukrainian “neutrality” and “demilitarisation”—conditions that would effectively strip Ukraine of sovereign self-defence. These demands are incompatible with the foundational premise of a negotiated peace between equal states. Negotiation, in this context, is not about compromise but about compelling Ukrainian capitulation by other means.
Russian engagement in talks has repeatedly coincided with moments of military or political pressure. Early negotiations in 2022 followed Russia’s failure to capture Kyiv; later diplomatic overtures emerged amid Ukrainian counteroffensives or Western debates about military aid. This pattern strongly suggests that negotiations function as a time-management strategy rather than a peace strategy.
By entering talks, Russia can:
-slow or complicate Western arms deliveries by creating the appearance that diplomacy might soon make them unnecessary;
-regroup, rotate forces, and replenish ammunition;
-stabilise domestic opinion by projecting reasonableness and restraint;
-exploit ceasefires tactically, as has occurred repeatedly in previous conflicts involving Russia.
Crucially, Russia has continued military operations during and immediately after negotiations, indicating that talks are not understood as constraints on force but as parallel tracks serving the same strategic goal.
Good-faith negotiation in international conflict typically involves reciprocal concessions, respect for interim agreements, and consistency between diplomatic statements and military conduct. Russia’s behaviour consistently fails these tests.
Agreements and assurances—whether humanitarian corridors, ceasefire undertakings, or confidence-building measures—have frequently been violated or instrumentalised. Civilian infrastructure has continued to be targeted even while Moscow claims to be seeking peace. Moreover, Russia has shown little interest in internationally recognised mediation frameworks that would impose transparency or accountability, preferring bilateral or opaque processes that it can control or abandon at will.
This behaviour aligns with a broader pattern in Russian statecraft, in which diplomacy is viewed less as a mutual problem-solving exercise and more as an extension of conflict by other means.
Another function of Russia’s negotiation posture is legitimisation. By repeatedly calling for talks, Putin positions Russia as a rational actor allegedly open to peace, while portraying Ukraine and its supporters as intransigent or controlled by external powers. This narrative is aimed not primarily at Kyiv, but at:
-non-aligned states in the Global South;
-Western publics fatigued by war;
-domestic Russian audiences sensitive to economic and human costs.
negotiation not meant to succeed
If negotiations fail—as they often do—Russia can claim that it tried diplomacy and was rebuffed, thereby justifying continued violence. Negotiation, in this sense, is not meant to succeed; it is meant to shift blame for its failure.
Putin’s long-standing strategic worldview further undermines the credibility of negotiation as an exit strategy. Russian military and political culture places heavy emphasis on endurance, attrition, and the belief that adversaries—particularly democratic societies—will lose resolve over time. From this perspective, prolonged war is not necessarily a failure; it is a mechanism for exhausting Ukraine and its supporters.
Negotiations thus serve a holding function: keeping diplomatic doors nominally open while Russia wagers that time, pressure, and political change abroad will eventually deliver outcomes that military force alone cannot secure.
If Russia were genuinely prepared to abandon the invasion, certain indicators would likely appear:
-withdrawal from occupied territories or at least suspension of annexation claims;
-acceptance of Ukraine’s sovereignty and security autonomy;
-credible third-party mediation with enforceable guarantees;
-demonstrable restraint in military operations during talks.
None of these conditions has been met. Instead, Russia continues to entrench its occupation, escalate strikes, and frame negotiations as contingent on Ukrainian submission.
President Putin’s engagement with negotiations over Ukraine is best understood not as a pathway to peace but as a strategic performance—a means of managing pressure while pursuing unchanged war aims. Negotiations are used to buy time, divide opponents, legitimise aggression, and sustain a narrative of reasonableness without making the concessions that peace would require. Until Russia abandons its foundational objective of subordinating Ukraine, diplomacy will remain a tool of war rather than its alternative.
Don’t be fooled.