Dan Andrews car & cycle crash: damning expert report

 Andrew L. Urban

An expert investigation into the infamous crash involving former Victorian Premier Dan Andrews (and family) in an SUV and 15 year old cyclist Ryan Meuleman on January 7, 2013 found “a lack of police adherence to standard practices, lack of rigour in the investigation and deliberate misdirection and factual inconsistencies.” It also identifies 10 “highly unusual aspects” and 13 troubling, unresolved questions.

Wrongfulconvictionsreport.org has obtained a copy of the 36 page report, prepared for proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria, by Dr Raymond Shuey AM APM, FAIM, FIPAA, RRSP, BA. Dr Shuey has 41 years’ experience in Victoria Police at all ranks from Constable to Acting Deputy Commissioner, followed by 20 years in international road safety specialising in crash investigation. His PhD doctorate was in international road safety.

We have previously referred to the report but some readers, notably eagle-eyed Dan Andrews supporter Garry Stannus, have been keen to read it for themselves. We publish sections of the report for the benefit of readers.

35. FINDINGS

In reviewing the known evidence, and with consideration to the undisputed path of thecyclist, the approximate point of impact, the injuries to the cyclist, the squealing of tyres in the vehicle manoeuvre, the absence of braking of either the vehicle or cyclist, the trajectory of the cyclist and landing after the collision, the vehicle braking distance, and the damage to the vehicle, I make the following observations and findings:

16. The impact occurred in Ridley Street 27 metres from the centre-white line point of Melbourne Road, Blairgowrie,

17. The point of impact was approximately 1.5metres onto the bitumen from the cyclistentry point where the road width is 3.8 metres placing the SUV still partially on theincorrect side of the road at that 27-metre point

18. It was definitely not a low-speed vehicle impact,
19. It was definitely not a high-speed bike impact against a slow speed vehicle – otherwise the flip motion of the cyclist would have been in a different and opposite direction to his actual trajectory,

20. If the vehicle was travelling from a stationary start in Melbourne Road, 27 metres prior to impact, it would not have reached the resultant speed to cause the damage and injuries. Low speed impacts propel pedestrians and cyclists forward of impact. This impact was so severe, it flipped the cyclist i.e. the hit, the flip onto the bonnet, propulsion over the roof line and then sideways onto the roadway. This throw distance, and angle is critical and together with the trajectory indicates the vehicle was travelling at speed prior to impact

21. The forward momentum of the SUV carried the cyclist a further 5.7 metres (throw distance)

22. It is stated that neither party saw the other before impact. There is no evidence of evasive action of either party

23. The track where the tool laden bike was being ridden was a gravel/sandy track notenabling any bike speed as well as there being a distinct lip for the rider to negotiateprior to crossing Ridley Street and with foliage obstructing the view to the rider’s left (aswell as the driver’s view of the rider). The rider’s explanation, the bike, the load, plus thetrack do not enable any type of entry speed on the part of the cyclist.

24. From the tyre marks on the roadway and observing the pattern of behaviour of drivers undertaking a right-hand turn into Ridley Street, it appears as common practice to undertake a sweep turn when negotiating this right-hand turn. The possibility of tyre marks was ignored by the attending police

25. The statement of Brad Morgan, (independent and potentially material witness), that he heard the squeal of tyres, immediately prior to impact, is an indication of higher than usual speed to negotiate any type of vehicle movement – acceleration, deceleration, braking or turning. (I observed several vehicles negotiating the turn at approximately 25kph without stopping and did not hear any abnormal tyre noises),

26. The statements from both Daniel and Catherine Andrews that their vehicle stopped at Melbourne Road are not consistent with impact consequences, nor the report by Brad Morgan of the squeal of tyres prior to impact. This version submitted by Daniel and Catherine Andrews (in unusual prepared sworn statements 3 weeks following the event (dated 31st January and 5th February 2013) is subject to challenge. Further, the content of the statements do not align with normal police procedures in obtaining full explanations and circumstances surrounding a crash of this nature. i.e. the content of the statements do not match the gravity of the incident. NB: The need to eliminatenumerous factors including, speed, fatigue, distractions of children, mobile phone, other distractions, and familiarity with the vehicle have not been addressed.

27. The absence of any normal/routine police procedures being followed, and the absence of tangible preserved evidence or legitimate investigation from the attending police –specifically no point of impact, no point of references, no point of rest for either vehicle or body, no scene containment or vehicle preservation, no measurements, no photographs, no scientific reconstruction, no eye witness testimony (no separation of witnesses), no effective door knocks, and no preliminary breath test

28. The effective vehicle stopping distance of 19.2metres following impact is indicative of aspeed 45kph prior to impact.

30. From the above information, it is my opinion that the impact speed of the vehicle was in excess of 40kph and more likely to be in the range of 40kph to 50kph.
31. It is most probable that the vehicle undertook a sweep turn at speed, cutting the cornerand still on the incorrect side of the roadway in Ridley Street, 27 metres from Melbourne Road when the collision occurred,
32. Failure to follow Police Procedures

Further conclusion in relation to the police investigation, not following normal police procedures written policy and custom and practice:

1. Life threatening and serious injury investigations are to be conducted by experienced police officers, (Not followed)

2. The Major Collision Investigation Unit (MCIU) is to be notified of every fatal or life-threatening collision – to determine their attendance, (Not followed)

3. For collision types involving serious injury, the first response and investigating unit is to Highway Patrol within the PSA or elsewhere (Not followed).

4. The MCIU may attend and provide specialist assistance where the involvement of police islikely to bring discredit to Victoria Police (Not followed)

5. Failure to follow normal practice and procedures in isolating, containing, scene preservation, and separating and interview witnesses (Not followed)

6. Failure to isolate with crime scene tape preserving evidence (Not followed)Where a VIP or dignitary is involved in a serious crash, it is normal to notify the AssistantCommissioner, Traffic in case of media attention (Not followed),
7. Failure to record any measurements, especially the critical point of impact, points ofreference, skid and tyre marks (before and after impact), as well as points of rest of the vehicle and the victim (Not followed) ,

9. Failure to provide a referenceable scene diagram as required by policy, procedures and instructions (Not followed),

10. Allowing a vehicle with an obscured/smashed windscreen to be driven from the scene of anear-fatal crash (Dangerous action),

11. Failure to undertake a PBT, falsely recording it as negative, and then later attempts to justify this omission (A documented lie),

12. Failure to follow the principles of investigation i.e. an investigation is a search for the truth in the interests of justice and according to law (The truth is still outstanding)

13. Prejudice: Failure to keep an open mind and breaching a basic investigation tenet i.e. Bias, prejudice and preconception are the forerunners to defeat. This is evident with early recorded attempts to write the crash off as “No further Police Action” (NFPA) without a thorough investigation and within five hours of the actual crash. i.e. at 1821 hours on 7th January 2013 (at a time when there were no statements, no measurements, no photograps and no evidence of support for the findings. Further there are numerous other references throughout recorded police information for NFPA and continued attempts to level blame with the rider (Demonstrated bias).

14. Failure to have the vehicle forensically examined (A careless or intentional omission)
15. There is not even a recorded police statement from the attending police to explain theirversion of recordings and why (The excuse would be that it is all in the TIS report, the Form502 and the investigation notes NB: Often in conflict and all over the place). (Sloppy policework)

16. Overall, the investigation demonstrates a course of behaviour and pattern of recordings that were unprofessional, at best sloppy and with rudimentary attempts to cover-upinadequacies. These deficiencies may be interpreted as deliberate or careless.
17. No formal investigation processes followed,

1. Recording the driver as Catherine KESIK, in the TIS Crash Report and elsewhere consistently referred as Catherine Andrews in all other reports, statements etc without explanation or correction – considered a deliberate and conscious misdirection for the audit trail.

1. No scene photographs, however, stated to be taken the following day (although noevidence that they were taken and none have been produced)

1. No witnesses recorded from the scene (Brad Morgan, Jane Crittendon). Names andparticulars would normally be taken for follow up, Manipulation of the PBT data recordings in the TIS report,

Consideration of door knock for witnesses, only after prompting and then notvalidated,

Advising victim’s father to obtain details of other party from FOI or TAC

A rudimentary and unprofessional attempt at crash reconstruction with nolegitimate evaluation (undertaking a sweep turn in a marked police vehicle)

The critical issue from any Supervisor (There are many in the recordings including IBAC)

1. Accepting the Surname of KESIK in the Crash TIS report – in conflict with all other reports and allowing this to remain unchallenged and not amended at any time

2. 3. Why has this mis-direction still not been addressed?

If S/C Sage was to be “counselled” for the PBT omission, why was Constable Ward not likewise counselled?

4. 5. Why was this PBT omission only addressed after media reports?

Why was the TIS report not immediately amended when this became known? (NK when amended but not before the FOI release of February 2013)

The prepared statements, sworn by both Catherine and Daniel Andrews only have basic content to write off the crash investigation and should not have been accepted by any supervisor, review or audit.

38. The cover-up of a political figure in a potential media incident

Several highly unusual aspects identified:

1. S/C Sage volunteering to attend the crash on the pretext that her unit was closer when in fact she was at Rye Police Station with urgent correspondence and then taking 6½ minutes before leaving for the job.

2. 3. No experienced police attending the scene
4. Non-contact with MCIU, Highway Patrol, or other police services.

No questioning on why a non-govt employee was driving a

government allocated vehicle

5. No measurements or scene photos taken or any police protocols

followed

6. Why the name of KESIK is recorded on the TIS report as the

retrievably indexed driver.

7. Why no breath test and falsely recording information as to its

disposition (twice)

8. The non-challenge of the Andrews’ version, when it was clearly

presented contrary to the available evidence

9. The non-supply of driver and owner particulars to the injured

party or representative.

10. The hasty conclusion to write the crash off as NFPA at 6.21pm

that evening having spent only 35 minutes attending the scene?

39. Unresolved questions:

Who was the driver of the vehicle?

The critical time of the crash, the reporting times, the action times and any interventions

What intervention occurred to ensure that no further police action or investigation occurred?

Were the Andrews at the sailing club for lunch as advised by Daniel to Jane Crittenden or at the Beach as later asserted?

What phone calls or other communication was sent or received to impact on thelegitimate outcome of this investigation?

Why did S/C Sage jump the call to take over, when another unit had already been allocated the call and was en route?

(7) Why was the incident written off at 6.21pm that same evening with only 35 minutes in possible examination of the scene?

(8) Why was the surname KESIK recorded on the TIS report and Government Insurance Records?

(9) Why were none of the official protocols and policies followed?

(10) If the SUV had commenced from a standing start, and only travelled a few metres and the brakes were immediately applied on impact, how come it took 19.2 metres to stop?

(11) Why cross examine victim, Ryan at length and not challenge Catherine and Daniel Andrews version of events?

(12) Why take a photo of the vehicle later at 29 Ridley Street and not in situ at the scene?

(13) Who authorised Daniel Andrews to remove the unroadworthy vehicle to be driven from the scene?

(Apologies for formatting errors)

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