Andrew L. Urban
The ‘ISIS Brides’ and their children might sit in Australian public imagination as versions of the Virgin Mary and her son Jesus, perhaps as depicted by Michaelangelo’s famous Pieta, all solemn figures of love, death, sorrow and the milk of human kindness. In reality, these are early teenage children radicalised since birth from whom the soured milk of human unkindness oozes like puss. If you think that’s too harsh, take a look at the venomous children in one of the Syrian camps attacking a US news reporter Should they be welcomed in Australia?
Child combatants like those linked to ISIS brides can be extraordinarily dangerous due to their indoctrinated zeal, moral leverage in battle, and potential for long-term radicalization. Children are highly impressionable, making them ideal for deep ideological programming. In ISIS-controlled territories, fighters were encouraged to train their offspring as “lion cubs” (ashbal), with indoctrination starting as young as age six and military training by nine. This created fiercely loyal recruits who viewed violence as a religious duty. For children of ISIS brides—many now detained in camps like Al-Hol in Syria—these early exposures persist, with hard-line women continuing daily indoctrination programs. Reports indicate that some of these “cubs” are smuggled out for further training in desert areas, potentially turning them into future insurgents. Their unyielding fanaticism, un tempered by adult skepticism, can lead to acts of extreme brutality, such as beheadings or suicide bombings, without hesitation.
ISIS propaganda videos showed children executing captives, exploiting this dynamic to demoralize enemies. In camps, incidents like a 16-year-old stabbing his friend to death on instructions from ISIS handlers highlight how these children can carry out targeted violence with chilling efficiency. Broader studies on child soldiers, including those in ISIS, note their recklessness—stemming from underdeveloped risk assessment—makes them willing to undertake high-risk missions that adults might avoid. EU officials have labelled these children a “ticking time bomb,” warning that without rehabilitation, they could seed new waves of terrorism.
The danger extends beyond immediate combat. Children of ISIS brides, often under 12 and numbering in the thousands in detention (e.g., about 93% of Al-Hol’s 55,000 residents are women and children), grow up in brutal environments conducive to radicalization. As boys reach adolescence, they may be transferred to prisons with adult fighters, further entrenching violent ideologies. Repatriation debates in countries like Australia underscore this: officials fear returning these children could lead to “mass casualty events” or imported radicalization, with some trained from age five to glorify killing.
Allow me a personal reflection. The writer was an 11 year old in Budapest during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, where youth—often teenagers and young students—played a pivotal role in resisting Soviet forces. While the revolutionaries weren’t typically as young as the “lion cubs” of ISIS (who started training around ages 6-9), many Hungarian fighters were adolescents aged 13-19, blending youthful audacity with makeshift tactics against a superior military. This context highlights parallels in their perceived danger through fearlessness and unpredictability, but also stark differences, as the Hungarian youth were driven by spontaneous patriotism rather than long-term extremist grooming.
Youth combatants in 1956 exhibited qualities that made them formidable, echoing some dangers seen in indoctrinated child fighters like those of ISIS brides. Hungarian teenagers, lacking formal military training, compensated with raw courage and improvisation, often charging Soviet tanks with Molotov cocktails—homemade petrol bombs that immobilized armoured vehicles.
Media reports describe them as “fearless teenagers” who fought in street battles, using partisan techniques learned informally, and sustaining resistance for days despite overwhelming odds. This mirrors the ISIS cubs’ willingness to undertake suicidal or high-risk acts due to underdeveloped risk assessment, but in Hungary, it stemmed from idealistic fervour for national freedom rather than religious fanaticism.