Andrew L. Urban
As the possibility of the war in Gaza coming to an end draws near, I find myself wondering whether Gazans are innocent victims or participants (some perhaps reluctantly) in the war. On the one hand, polls show that at least 70% approved of the carnage Hamas committed in Israel, yet they are used as human shields for the Hamas fighters.
Some news has emerged that a number of Gazans have been punished for criticising Hamas, but hatred of Jews still remains their deep seated ideology. A confusing, contradictory picture emerges from polls (see below); how does this inform our society regarding how the 3,000 Gazans permitted to come to Australia will fit in.
Public opinion in Gaza regarding Hamas has fluctuated significantly since the group’s 2006 election victory and its 2007 takeover of the territory. Pre-October 7, 2023, support hovered around 30-40% for Hamas as a governing entity, often driven by dissatisfaction with the rival Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) and perceptions of Hamas as a resistance force against Israeli occupation. The October 7 attack initially boosted Hamas’s popularity due to a surge in nationalistic sentiment, but the ensuing war and humanitarian crisis in Gaza have led to a marked decline, particularly in the Strip itself. Support remains higher in the West Bank, where the conflict’s direct impacts are less severe.
Immediately post-October 7, Hamas’s factional support in Gaza reached 42-43%, with 64-71% viewing the attack as “correct” across polls. This reflected a “rally around the flag” effect amid perceived Israeli aggression.
By mid-2025, support for Hamas governance fell to 30-38%, with only 38% endorsing October 7 (down from 71%). A majority (51%) now believes Hamas will lose the war, and 48% back protests demanding Hamas relinquish control—unprecedented under its rule. Only 12% of Gazans blame Hamas for their suffering (stable since 2023), but 87% in late 2024 polls held it responsible for starting the war.
These findings are primarily from PCPSR (Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research), a Ramallah-based nonprofit with a track record of transparent methodology (e.g., random sampling, ±3-4% margins). AWRAD’s October 2024 outlier (6% support) aligns with post-ceasefire shifts but differs from PCPSR, possibly due to question framing. No single poll is definitive in a war zone, but the downward trajectory in Gaza is consistent across sources.
The culture of Antisemitic Arabs makes it difficult to draw any conclusions as to how 2 million Gazans will think, feel and behave when the war ends. Or how will those with visas to Australia ….